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ESSENCE AND REALIZATION IN THE 
ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT
Timothy G. McCarthy
A persistent complaint about modal forms of the ontological argument is that 
the characteristic modalized existence assumptions of these arguments are 
simply too close to the conclusion to be of much probative value in establishing 
it. I present an abstract form of the ontological argument in which the proper-
ties imputed to the divine nature by these assumptions are replaced by any 
of a wide class of properties of a sort I call “actualizing.” These include basic 
theistic attributes such as authorship, sovereignty and omniscience. The import 
of these arguments is to show that the metaphysical coherence of some of the 
most familiar conceptions of the divine nature ensures their actual realization.
I
I shall present a new form of the ontological argument or, perhaps better, a 
new form for ontological arguments. The ontological argument has many 
alternative expressions, and so it is well to begin by placing the present one 
in context. As I am using the term here, an ontological argument delineates 
a set of properties that are assumed to constitute a partial specification 
of the nature of God. These are agreed by all parties to the dispute about 
theism to be properties that would be necessarily exemplified by God if 
there were such a person. Let us say that such a set is essentially consistent if 
it is possible that there is an object necessarily exemplifying each property 
in the set. The argument then shows, or purports to show, that if the set 
is essentially consistent, then there actually is some object satisfying each 
property in the set. If successful, the argument thus accomplishes the ap-
parently remarkable feat of amplifying the grounds we have for supposing 
the given partial description of the nature of God to be essentially consis-
tent to grounds for believing in the actual existence of an item falling under 
that description. Positive theological uses of such an argument assume that 
we have good reasons to suppose that the given set of properties is in fact 
essentially consistent, so that the actual existence of an item falling under 
the conjunction of those properties may be soundly inferred.
A persistent difficulty with these arguments lies in an interaction be-
tween the essential consistency assumption and the content of the assumed 
description of the divine nature. In particular, the property of existence, 
characterized in the natural way in terms of quantification and identity, has 
often been placed into the divine nature on the ground that it is a perfection, 
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or on the ground that it is a positive property, or on some other ground. 
Within a familiar modal-logical framework, the necessary existence of an 
item falling under the relevant properties is then an immediate byproduct 
of the inclusion of the existence property in the partial specification of the 
divine nature and the essential consistency of that set of properties. As 
Robert Adams has remarked with regard to Gödel’s ontological argument, 
such a consistency assumption seems to be simply too close to the conclu-
sion of the argument to be of much probative value in establishing it.1
In the present paper, existence and other ontically tendentious properties 
figuring in ontological arguments are located within a wide class of proper-
ties I call “actualizing.” Within that same familiar modal-logical framework, 
it will be shown that ascribing any actualizing property to the divine na-
ture is sufficient to arm a form of the ontological argument; and some of 
these properties flow from what would normally be regarded as standard, 
ontically-untendentious conceptual commitments of theism. Within that 
framework, then, the consistency of some of our most ordinary conceptions 
of nature of God may be shown to imply the actual existence of a being real-
izing those conceptions. The effect of all of this will be to blur the distinction 
between the conceptual and the ontological commitments of theism.
II
Let us begin by considering a bit more closely a traditional structure 
for such an argument.2 The divine nature has often been conceived as 
an interconnected set of perfective properties. A perfective property is 
roughly an idealized or limiting case of a type of state, capacity, condi-
tion, or power; it is usually added that such properties are “positive” (in 
some sense). Thus, for example, omnipotence is an idealized condition of 
power and omniscience of knowledge. A familiar idea is that the divine 
nature is a maximal ensemble of such perfective properties. One form of 
the ontological argument proceeds from the thesis that existence is a posi-
tive characteristic of things. Idealization of the concept of existence leads 
to various notions of ontic robustness, or stable existence. The limiting 
case of ontic robustness is necessary existence, which is then the perfective 
property corresponding to the existence property.
Suppose, then, that the totality of relevant perfectives is simply consistent, 
so that there is a possible world in which these properties are jointly exem-
plified. If “w” denotes such a world, there is an inhabitant G of w that, in 
addition to falling under all of the traditional perfective properties (omnipo-
tence, omniscience and so on) in w, also exemplifies the property of necessary 
existence in w. A widely held formal principle concerning the concept of the 
broadly logical or metaphysical necessity in play here is the characteristic 
axiom for the modal system S5, which states that if it is possible that an out-
1R. M. Adams, Introductory note to “Ontological Proof.”
2This is a version, more or less, of the argument given by Leibniz in the New Essay Con-
cerning the Human Understanding.
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come is necessary, then that outcome is necessary tout court. If the relevant 
modality respects S5, then, G necessarily, and thus actually, exists.
That is almost the conclusion of the ontological argument, but there is 
still one difficulty. The argument seeks to establish the existence of a being 
in the actual world that exemplifies each of the divine perfections. We 
have shown only that there exists a being G in the actual world that falls 
under the relevant properties in the world w: but we have no reason as yet 
to suppose that the Godlike characteristics of G in w should apply to G 
also in the actual world.
We can address this difficulty by means of a natural generalization of 
the robustness idea. Let P be any perfective property. G falls under P at the 
world w, but G, it seems, would be less than maximally perfect if G’s exem-
plification of P were accidental to G at w. G is more perfect, ceteris paribus, 
the wider the class of possible worlds containing w wherein G exemplifies 
P. In the best case, G should exemplify P at each world possible relative 
to w, so that G’s exemplification of P is necessary to G at w. Again by the 
characteristic axiom of S5, then, G’s exemplification of P is necessary and 
thus actual. Thus G exists and exemplifies each of the relevant perfective 
properties in the actual world. That is the conclusion we sought.
III
The above is a sketch, in terms of the possible worlds heuristic, of a 
modal form of the ontological argument. It is inspired by and more or 
less strongly resembles a number of modal ontological arguments familiar 
from the literature. The first-order logical framework for such arguments 
is supplied by the modal logic S5. Since these arguments talk not only of 
objects but of properties of objects and sets of such properties, their proper 
formalization in terms of modalities requires a third-order modal logic in 
which the second-order variables range over properties of objects in the 
first-order domain, and the third-order variables range over sets of such 
properties. I will be concerned throughout with arguments of this sort.
The framework developed here accommodates the above argument 
and its variants, as well as some versions of the ontological argument that, 
as far as I know, are new. That framework is based on a general observa-
tion in pure third-order modal logic that is introduced in section VI below. 
Given a set X0 of initial properties, we first show how to characterize a set 
X of properties on the basis of X0 and certain closure conditions; X is the 
smallest collection of properties containing the properties in X0 and satis-
fying the conditions of closure. The closure requirements provide roughly 
that X is closed under a strong relation of entailment between properties, 
and that the necessitation ϕ of a property ϕ belongs to X whenever ϕ 
does. These closure conditions are satisfied by the collection of properties 
necessary to any object in the de re sense, which we may call the nature of 
that object. Thus if the initial properties are all essential to some possible 
object, then the resulting total collection X is essentially consistent, and 
comprises part of the nature of that object.
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Say that a set of properties is structurally consistent if it does not contain 
any property along with its negation. The observation of section V says 
that if at least one of the initial properties is of the special sort that I call 
“actualizing,” then either the total set X of properties is actually instan-
tiated in each possible world (i.e., each property of X is exemplified, at 
every world w, by an object that exists or is actual in w), or the set X is 
structurally inconsistent. It turns out that existence is trivially an actual-
izing property, and the version of the result obtained by placing existence 
along with the standard perfections into the initial set X0 is a natural refor-
mulation of the ontological argument sketched in section II above.
We can, however, consider alternative initial sets, which constitute 
non-standard starting points. The trouble with the classical starting point, 
using existence as an initial property, is that on weak modal assumptions 
the structural consistency of the resulting total set is trivially equivalent 
to the possible existence of a being that necessarily exemplifies each of the 
initial properties, including existence; again, this assumption has seemed 
to many philosophers to be simply too close to the conclusion of the onto-
logical argument to be of much help in establishing it. It would mark an 
advance over traditional forms of the argument if we could think of the 
initial properties—the properties in the set X0—as being uncontroversial 
constituents of a theistic conception of the nature of God, and by that I 
mean properties that all parties of the dispute about theism would regard 
as constitutive of the nature of God if there were such a being. To put 
existence into X0 is not far from saying, from the outset, that any possible 
being exemplifying the divine nature necessarily exists. This is a conclusion 
that one might hope to derive from a basic characterization of the divine 
nature; but it is tendentious to regard it as fundamental.
I shall argue in section VII that there are in fact very familiar components 
of theistic conceptions of the nature of God that are actualizing properties 
in the technical sense required by section VI, and which thus, if put into X0, 
lead to a corresponding X satisfying its conclusion: either the properties in 
X are simultaneously exemplified at each world, or X is structurally incon-
sistent. These include theologically central properties of God characterized 
in terms of casual or epistemic verbs (i.e., in terms of his role): e.g., God 
as pantokrator or all-creative/sustaining, as omniscient, as sovereign, etc. 
Thus any story that construes these features as constituents of his nature or 
essence will be necessarily realized if it is structurally consistent.
I shall offer no structural consistency proof for the particular choices 
of X we shall consider. However, the suggested candidates for member-
ship in the initial set X0 are core components of theistic conceptions of 
the nature of God; and the relations which lead from X0 to X are closure 
conditions which are satisfied by the nature of any object whatever. A bit 
more precisely: no matter what properties you put into X0, if the properties 
in X0 are essential to an object a in a possible world w, then all properties 
in X are necessarily exemplified by a in w; and for the particular choices of 
X0 we shall consider, theism is committed to the thesis that the properties 
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in question follow from the very identity of God, and are thus essential to 
him. The summary import of sections VI–IX below is that the metaphysical 
possibility of an item with a nature realizing some of the most familiar and 
basic theistic attributes requires the necessary and thus actual existence of 
an item exemplifying those attributes.
IV
Unfortunately, seemingly minor variations in the semantic underpinnings 
of modal ontological arguments can have major consequences for ques-
tions of possible existence and actuality of just the sort we are dealing 
with, and so it is appropriate to pause to describe a bit more explicitly the 
semantical framework that will be adopted here.
That framework is not at all unusual, and probably deserves to be called 
standard. It is essentially the model theoretic semantics for quantified modal 
logic introduced by Saul Kripke in 1963.3 On this view, an interpretation of 
a elementary modal language L is given by data that may be packaged in a 
5-tuple ℑ = (K, H, R, ψ, Φ). K, H, and R supply the modal background: K is a 
collection of objects, in the intended application taken to represent possible 
worlds; H is a member of K (the “actual world”); and R is a binary relation 
of relative possibility on K. In the intended application, it is assumed that 
K represents the set of all logically possible total situations, and that each 
such situation is possible relative to any other, so that R is the universal 
relation on K. ψ is a set-valued function on the domain K of possible worlds: 
for any element w of K, ψ(w) is thought of as the collection of objects that 
exist or are actual at w. The domain of ℑ is the set |ℑ| consisting of all of the 
inhabitants of all of the worlds in K, that is |ℑ| comprises all and only the 
members of some set ψ(w). Finally, Φ is a two-place function that associates 
each world w of H and each n-place relation symbol P of L with an n-ary 
relation on |ℑ|, the extension of P in ℑ at the world w.
For a fixed world w in K, the formula Px1 … xn is true on the interpreta-
tion ℑ at w for an assignment of values a1, … , an to x1, … , xn iff (a1, … , an) 
∈ Φ(w,P); it is not required that the objects in question are members of the 
set ψ(w) of objects that exist at w. However, in the given interpretation 
first-order quantifiers are restricted at w to the set ψ(w) of objects existing 
at w, with the welcome consequence that at a given world the sentence 
(∃x)A(x) asserts the existence of an object at that world falling under A(x). 
If ϕ is a formula and w a world of ℑ, then ϕ is true at w for an assignment 
if ϕ is true for that assignment at every world w* such that w*Rw; if, as is 
usually assumed here, R is universal, that simply means “at every world.”
The extension of the indicated semantics to the higher-order framework 
mentioned above presents no difficulty. We extend the first-order modal 
language L to a language L* by adding second- and third-order quantifi-
cation, and we extend the first-order semantics for L to L* by construing 
3Kripke, “Semantical Considerations on Modal Logic.” Acta Philosophical Fennica 16 
(1963), 83–94.
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second-order variables to range over properties defined over the relevant 
first-order domain and third-order variables to range over sets of such 
properties. For this purpose, a property in the interpretation ℑ may be 
identified with a function mapping each world in K to a subset of the do-
main of ℑ, whose members are the objects taken to fall under the property 
at that world. The definition of truth in L on ℑ relative to a world and an 
assignment of objects to first-order variables is extended to a definition of 
truth in L*, additionally relative to an assignment of properties and sets of 
properties to second- and third-order variables, in the natural way.
A salient feature of the Kripke semantics is that at a given world on a 
given interpretation, predicates may be defined for, and variables may 
take as values, objects that do not exist at that world. This aspect of the 
semantics can seem curious but is crucial for various applications. For ex-
ample, one can define an existence predicate ε(x) quite naturally in terms 
of quantification and identity, via (∃y) y = x; at any world w, ε(x) is true 
of exactly the items that exist or are actual at w. The existence predicate 
will be defined but false at w for any object that does not exist at w. If the 
interpretation is to reflect our actual modal opinions, we must be able to 
say, correctly, that there are some things that might not have existed (or 
which, equivalently, do not necessarily exist). We can easily express this 
claim in terms of ε(x), by means of the formula (∃x) ¬ε(x). For the pur-
pose of making this sentence true, the occurrence of ‘x’ within the “” is 
construed as taking a value at a possible world that does not exist in that 
world but does exist in the actual world. Another example arises from 
affirming the necessity of identity in the form ∀x∀y (x = y → x = y), which 
requires of each actual object a that the pair (a,a) fall into the extension of 
the identity predicate at every world w, whether or not a exists at w.
The present framework, then, assumes a universal domain of possible 
objects but supposes that quantifiers at a world range only over objects that 
are actual at that world. Perhaps the biggest advantage of this arrangement 
lies in its allowing the satisfaction clauses for “” and “∃” to be stated in 
the most natural way: an object (or n-tuple) falls under the necessitation 
of a predicate if and only if it falls under the predicate in each possible 
world, and at any world “∃” expresses existence. On the alternative “actu-
alist” construal of the domains of worlds, the domain of a possible world 
is restricted to objects existing therein. This requires a reworking of the 
interpretation of “” if there are to be any true ascriptions of de re neces-
sity involving contingent objects, but the obvious ways of doing this lead 
to trouble. Objects should be counted as necessarily self-identical whether 
or not they necessarily exist (I shall take it as at least sufficient for an item 
to fall under a property necessarily that it do so essentially, and I take self-
identity to be a paradigmatic essential property of any object). The most 
natural suggestion for accommodating actualism is to provide, where “A” 
represents a monadic predicate, that an object satisfies a sentence of the 
form “A” if it falls under A at each world in which it exists. The difficulty 
is that this gets another family of cases flatly wrong; the most typical of 
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these involves the predicate “(x exists),” which is false of any contin-
gently existing object, but trivially true of any such object on the actualist 
reconstrual of “.”
In defending the thesis that the Kripke semantics with a universal do-
main is the proper semantic framework for representing modal ontological 
arguments, I do not mean to commit myself to any particular metaphysical 
interpretation of that framework. We require a system of models wherein 
possibilia are in a suitable sense represented, but within the present enter-
prise it is left open whether the constituents of these models are nonactual 
objects or actual ersatzes for them. What is important about such objects 
for an account of semantic relations is their structural role and not their 
particular identities.
V
In this section I will develop the metaphysical background of the form 
of the modal ontological argument presented below. For this purpose, 
we assume given a fixed model ℑ of the sort described above, extended 
to third-order logic in the indicated way. We think of ℑ as providing a 
description of the necessity concept (broadly logical, or metaphysical 
necessity) relevant to modal ontological arguments. In particular, the ac-
cessibility relation of ℑ is assumed to be the universal relation between 
the worlds of ℑ.
Some notation will be useful. First, if K is the set of worlds associated 
with ℑ, for any property ϕ, ϕ is the property that maps any world w 
onto the set of all objects in the domain falling under ϕ at each world in 
K. Secondly, if S is a set of properties, ∧S is the property that is satisfied by 
an object a at a possible world w iff a falls under each property in S at w. 
S entails a property ϕ iff for any object a and world w ∈ K, if a falls under 
∧S at w, then a also falls under ϕ at w. If A is a monadic predicate in the 
free variable x, (λx)A is the property it expresses; officially, then, (λx)A is a 
function defined on K that maps any world w in K onto the set of all objects 
a satisfying A in ℑ at w. We define ε (existence) as the property (λx)(∃y)x = y.
I shall be concerned with a special sort of property that I call “actual-
izing.” As the terminology would suggest, an actualizing property is one 
that is exemplified by an object at a world only if the item exists or is actual 
at that world. Equivalently, a property is actualizing if it entails the existence 
property ε, which of course is trivially an actualizing property. Essential 
properties of contingently existing individuals are not actualizing, since 
such an individual falls under its essential properties in each possible world 
but does not exist in all of them.4 Thus, for example, any object is necessarily 
4The semantic framework of the foregoing section is designed to accommodate this obser-
vation, since the extension of a property at a world consists of the objects that fall under the 
property at that world, whether or not they exist therein. The intuitive idea the reader should 
bear in mind is that the essential properties of an object are those that follow from a complete 
specification of its identity. This point of view about essential properties has been persua-
sively defended by Kit Fine in “Essence and Modality”; see also “The Logic of Essence.”
12 Faith and Philosophy
self-identical, and so on the intended reading of de re necessity self-identical 
in each possible world, whether or not it is actual at that world.
Actualizing properties are closely connected to a corresponding family 
of relations that I shall also call “actualizing.” An actualizing relation 
holds of a pair (a, b) at a world w only if both a and b exist at w. There are 
weaker notions of left- and right-actualization: a relation R is left-actual-
izing iff, given that a pair (a, b) falls under R at w and b exists at w, then a 
exists at w; similarly, mutatis mutandis, for “right-actualizing.” Obviously 
any relation that is actualizing is both left- and right-actualizing. That the 
left- and right-actualization properties are jointly weaker than the actual-
izing property may be seen by considering identity, which is both left- and 
right-actualizing but not actualizing (again, an object is self-identical in 
every world, whether or not it exists in that world).
A pertinent example, for the purposes of the present discussion, of a 
relation that is left- but not right-actualizing is the father of. On the thesis 
of the necessity of origin defended by Kripke, it is a necessary property of 
any particular woman that she has the father that she actually does. If Karl 
is Alma’s father, then, the pair (Karl, Alma) falls into the father of relation in 
each possible world. This does not require either to exist at any particular 
world; however, the (actual) father of Alma exists and begets her in any 
world in which Alma exists. This shows the father of relation to be left-
actualizing. Clearly, however, the father can exist without begetting that 
particular child. Thus the father of is not right-actualizing. There is a mild 
paradox here: for, it would appear that “x is the father of y” can be defined 
by “x begat y & x is male.” The difficulty is that the relation expressed by “x 
begat y” is actualizing. In fact, it is a paradigmatic example of an important 
species of actualizing relations that we shall shortly consider. If that is the 
case, however, the relation father of, thus defined in terms of “begat,” must 
also be actualizing. But it is not. I will try to sort this out at the conclusion 
of the present section.
In an important class of cases, an actualizing binary relation between 
two objects involves the existence of a connection between them in space 
and time; such a connection may, but need not be, causal. In such a case, I 
shall call the relation “real.” I take the notion of “connection” as primitive 
here, but a connection between two things is roughly a state of affairs that 
involves the objects themselves as constituents, and so exists at a world 
only if the constituent objects exist at that world. A real binary relation 
R(a,b) is thus equivalent to a form ∃xR*(x,a,b), wherein “x” ranges over 
connections of the relevant sort and R*(c, a, b) holds when c connects a 
to b in the relevant way. The ontological commitment of such a form to 
the existence of a and b is thus a product of three factors: the existential 
quantifier over connections; the fact that a and b are constituents of any 
connection between them; and the fact than a connection can exist at a 
world only if its constituents exist at that world.
Relations introduced by causal verbs are real. If “V ” represents such 
a verb, the form “a V-d b” holds at a world w iff there exists a connection 
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between the subject a and the object b which consists in a causal link be-
tween certain basic actions performed by a and an end-state of b.5 The verb 
“to beget” mentioned above is a typical example: “a begets b” holds at a 
world w iff there is a begetting of b by a at w, which is a generative connec-
tion between a and b in w involving both a and b as constituents. Examples 
of this sort are readily multiplied. However, not all predicates that intro-
duce real relations involve causal verbs; there are non-causal connections. 
Pure spatial relations between objects afford one example. The pair (a, b) 
falls under the relation is 50 km due north of at a world w if and only if 
there exists a longitudinal path p of length 50 km, oriented north to south, 
joining a to b at w; the connection in this case is not the path p itself but 
roughly the state of affairs consisting in p’s joining a to b.
Let’s now return briefly to the puzzle about fatherhood posed above. 
There is indeed a relation between people exactly defined by the condition 
“x begat y & x is male,” viz., x fathered y. This relation obtains between x 
and y when x is male and there is an appropriate connection between x 
and y, a state of affairs that consists in x’s begetting y; and this connection 
can exist only if both x and y exist. This means that the fathering relation is 
actualizing. On the other hand, if in fact y is the daughter of x, the property 
being the daughter of x is a property that y has essentially, and thus exempli-
fies in all possible worlds.6 This means that the pair (x, y) falls under the 
binary relation is the father of in each world whether the relata exist in that 
world or not. Thus fathers and is the father of are not even extensionally 
equivalent. What then is the relation between them? Here I shall simply 
state what I take the correct answer to be: x is the father of y just in case 
x fathers y in every world in which y exists, or, putting “F” for “fathers,” 
just in case ∀z (y = z → xFz). The characteristic structural features of the 
father of relation readily follow from this characterization: in particular, it 
is immediate that the father of relation is left- but not right-actualizing, and 
(via S4) that this relation obtains necessarily if it obtains at all. Similar con-
siderations will apply to a variety of analogous pairs involving verbs of 
creation or authorship, in particular the pair “creates” and “is the creator 
of,” which play a crucial role below.
5On an influential analysis of action sentences due to Donald Davidson, the sentence 
‘Shem kicked Shaun’ is true if and only if there is an action, e, such that e is a kicking of 
Shaun and e is performed by Shem. If e is taken to be a basic action (roughly, something that 
Shem can do independently of the causal structure of his context), then the action itself is 
not the required connection, since it can exist without its bringing about the relevant end 
state (for example, Shem could have performed the same basic action while missing Shaun 
entirely). The connection in this case is the second-order state of affairs which consists in e’s 
bringing about the end state in the appropriate way. The connection thus seems closer to 
what Davidson calls “an event [action] under a description.” See Davidson, “The Logical 
Form of Action Sentences.” 
6This is obviously a substantive metaphysical assumption. The contemporary doctrine 
of the necessity of origin derives from Kripke, Naming and Necessity, n56. It seems fair to say 
that the doctrine has won wide though not universal acceptance. 
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VI
In this section, I present a logical observation that will serve as a template 
for a class of modal ontological arguments. In what follows, ℑ is again 
a fixed Kripke model taken to describe the relevant necessity concept: 
various notions, e.g, “world,” “property,” “satisfies,” “actual,” “entails,” 
etc. should be understood as relativized to ℑ. A set X of properties is said 
to be realized by an object a at a world w iff a exists at w and satisfies each 
property in X therein. Here then is the observation:
Realization Lemma. Let X be any collection of properties defined over ℑ 
such that:
(i) if ϕ ∈ X, then (ϕ) ∈ X;
(ii) X is closed under entailment of properties;
(iii) if ¬ ϕ ∈ X, then ϕ ∉ X;
(iv) X contains at least one actualizing property.
Then X is realized at every world in ℑ.
The proof is straightforward. Suppose that X is a given set of properties 
satisfying the conditions (i)–(iv). Consider the property Xc = ¬∧X. Then the 
extension of ∧X is nonempty at some world. For suppose otherwise. Then 
the extension of Xc is universal at each world, so that X entails Xc. Thus 
Xc ∈ X by condition (ii). But since X entails ∧X, we have in the same way 
that ∧X ∈ X, which is impossible by condition (iii). Thus suppose that w is 
any world and α an object that falls under ∧X at w. Since, by condition (i), 
(ϕ) ∈ X for each property ϕ ∈ X, α falls under ϕ at w for any ϕ ∈ X, and 
thus satisfies each property in X at every possible world in ℑ. Now by (iv), 
some actualizing property A belongs to X. It follows that α falls under A, 
and thus exists, at each possible world in ℑ, so that α realizes X at every 
world in ℑ. This completes the proof.
The Realization Lemma is a rather easy result in pure third-order modal 
logic; it is readily formalized in an appropriate third-order extension of S5. 
As such, it has no philosophical implications. It acquires such implications 
only if an appropriate interpretation is supplied for the frame ℑ and the 
class X of properties above. ℑ, we have supposed, constitutes a satisfac-
tory basis for a model-theoretic account of our discourse about broadly 
logical or metaphysical necessity. To connect the ontological argument to 
the Realization Lemma, then, we have to construe X to be a theologically 
interesting set of properties. I will initially consider the following two pos-
sibilities for such a construal:
(1) X is the closure of the collection of all perfective properties of God 
under the entailment relation between properties.7
7Perfective properties are here understood the sense of section II above, roughly as ideal-
ized or limiting cases of positive conditions, capacities, or powers.
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(2) X is the collection of all essential properties of God (or the closure of 
that collection under the entailment relation between properties, if 
on this construal X is not already deductively closed).8
Neither of these suggestions quite works; it turns out that these two con-
struals of the set X present complementary obstructions to an attempt to 
use the Realization Lemma as a template for an ontological argument. 
But exploring them briefly will lead us to a more satisfactory proposal. 
Consider first (1). Conditions (ii) and (iii) are fulfilled on this construal; 
moreover, theists attribute various perfective properties to God that are 
actualizing and that would thus underwrite condition (iv). Prominently, a 
traditional form of the ontological argument regards necessary existence 
itself as such a property. A less tendentious example would be God’s cre-
ative relationship to the actual world, or his perfect knowledge of existing 
states of affairs. Both of these examples involve properties specified in 
terms of an underlying actualizing relation (introduced by the verbs “to 
create” and “to know,” the latter interpreted for the present purpose as 
expressing a real relation between an agent and a state of affairs).
The difficulty is that these examples do not comport with the condi-
tion (i). For example, for traditional theism the property of having created 
the actual world is a perfective property of God; but it is not one that he 
necessarily exemplifies if the actual world is only one of a multiplicity of 
worlds that he might have created.9 A similar problem arises for God’s 
omniscience with respect to the class of all propositions that are true in the 
actual world. Many perfective properties, in short, appear to be contingent 
(i.e., contingently exemplified by any object that exemplifies them); and 
thus the necessitation of such a property is not exemplifiable.
A parallel difficulty arises for interpretation (2), under which X is taken 
to consist of the properties essential to God. On that construal, the con-
ditions (i)–(iii) hold but condition (iv) becomes problematic. The basic 
difficulty is that it is not clear that any actualizing property is essential to 
God. There are various actualizing properties attributed to God by theists 
and which constitute central themes of traditional theism. Any descrip-
tion that characterizes God’s activity in the world, on the analysis of causal 
verbs adopted above, specifies an actualizing property, but not, in general, 
one that God falls under essentially. Again, for traditional theism, the fact 
that God created the world that happens to exist is an exceedingly im-
portant actualizing property that he exemplifies; but he might not have 
8This is roughly to say that X consists of all properties that are necessary to God in the 
relational (de re) sense. The necessary properties of an object are not uncommonly identified 
with its essential properties. On a more discriminating demarcation of essential properties, 
suggested by Kit Fine, the essential properties of an object are those that can in a certain 
sense be “read off” an appropriate specification of the object’s identity; see the papers cited 
in n4 above. It is then natural to suggest that the properties necessary to an object in the de re 
sense constitute the smallest collection containing its essential properties and closed under 
the entailment relation between properties.
9Such an assumption, of course, would be challenged by Leibniz; it would not hold, for 
example, if the actual world were undefeated and untied in perfection. 
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created the world that actually exists, and so he might not have exempli-
fied that property.
VII
Part of the allure that perfectionist versions of the ontological argument 
have enjoyed may perhaps stem from the idea that if God has a perfection, 
then it cannot be accidental that he exemplifies that perfection. It is part 
of the very core of familiar theistic conceptions of God that he is perfect in 
virtue of his nature or identity, which is one way of saying he exemplifies 
his perfections essentially. If that is so, the condition (i) in the Realization 
Lemma should after all be ensured if we take the class X to consist of the 
perfective properties of God, or the closure of that class under property 
entailment.
That something has gone wrong with this line of argument is shown 
by the sort of example introduced at the conclusion of the last section. 
Theism is not committed to the claim that God necessarily created any 
particular actual item (including the actual world itself); but it is com-
mitted to the view that God is the creative source of everything else that 
does in fact exist. Moreover, theism seems committed to the further view 
that this property, authorship, accrues to God in virtue of his nature, and is 
thus a property that he exemplifies necessarily. The thesis, then, is not that 
God necessarily created any particular actual item, but that necessarily he 
is the creator all else that is.
There is a longstanding controversy, running from the medieval nomi-
nalists through St. Thomas Aquinas to Descartes, about whether God 
may intelligibly be said to have created certain items that necessarily 
exist, objects of the sort we now call “abstract.”10 In order not to enter 
these troubled waters here, we may simply restrict our attention to a more 
guarded version of the authorship thesis, one that holds God to be the 
creative source of everything that contingently exists (or of everything else 
that contingently exists, if, contrary to the ontological argument, God him-
self should exist contingently). The logical form of such a commitment is
(a) (∀x)C F(g, x),
where the subscript “C ” indicates a restriction of the quantifier (∀x) to 
nondivine contingents; call the property ascribed to g by (a) restricted 
authorship. The predicate F(y, x) is read “y is the creator of x,” and is under-
stood in exact analogy to the predicate “y is father of x” considered above: 
to say that y is the creator of x is to say that y creates x in each world in 
10A negative answer is sometimes held to impugn God’s sovereignty. Descartes, of course, 
vigorously defended God’s creative power with respect to what he calls the “eternal truths,” 
traditionally regarded as necessary. For a nice discussion of the whole issue, see Alvin Plant-
inga, Does God Have a Nature?. Plantinga says that he regards the difficulties in reconciling 
divine sovereignty with the modal status of abstract objects as the best argument he knows 
for nominalism. 
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which x enjoys existence. Thus, writing F* for the verb “creates,” (a) may 
be expressed
(b) (∀x)C (ε(x) → F*(g, x))
Observe that (b) entails
(c) (∀x)C F*(g, x)
which asserts that God creates each nondivine contingent.
I shall now argue that  actualizing: i.e., if (a) holds at a possible world w, 
then g exists at w. The argument is straightforward, but requires one ad-
ditional assumption, viz.:
(NC) ∃xC(x) holds; i.e., for any world w, some nondivine contingent 
exists at w.
The justifications for (NC) I am aware of all make use of the assumption 
that there are fact- or event-like structures coordinated with at least some 
contingent propositions whose existence conditions match the truth and 
falsity conditions of the propositions. Thus, for example, for any con-
tingently true proposition of the form (∃x)Px, necessarily either the fact 
that Ps exist or the fact that Ps don’t exist contingently exists, and these 
existence conditions are rigidly correlated with the truth and falsity condi-
tions of that proposition. More generally, what is required is a contingent 
proposition p and a pair of possible objects p+ and p– such that necessarily 
p+ exists iff p is true and necessarily p– exists iff p is false. Thus p+ and p– are 
contingents whose existence conditions exclude one another but which 
are together modally exhaustive. As a first suggestion, we might take p+ 
to be p’s exemplification of truth and p– to be its exemplification of falsity.
Talk of “exemplifications” can be given a precise sense in terms of Kit 
Fine’s notion of a qua-object, and qua-objects make possible a variety of 
other routes to (NC). Qua-objects have the following existence and iden-
tity conditions:
(QE) For any object a and property P, the qua-object a qua P exists at a 
possible world w iff a exists and falls under P at w;
(QI) a qua P = b qua Q iff a = b and  P = Q.11
Here then is another argument for (NC): for any property P, let P* be the 
property defined for cardinal numbers that applies to a cardinal number 
κ at a world w iff exactly κ objects exist and fall under P at w. Let |P|w be 
the cardinal number of the set of objects that exist and fall under P at w. 
Suppose now that P is so chosen that the cardinal number of Ps varies 
from world to world but P is satisfied at any world by a bounded number 
of existing non-divine particulars. Then at any world w, |P|w qua P*, that 
is, the particular number that is the cardinal number of Ps at w qua being 
the cardinal number of Ps, exists at w, and is a non-divine contingent.
11Fine, “Acts, Events, and Things.”
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The above goes some distance, I believe, toward motivating (NC), 
but I cannot pretend to have offered anything like a complete defense. 
Certainly, it is always open to the skeptic to question the ontological clo-
sure conditions invoked above that give rise to the necessary existence 
of contingents. But particularly in the case of qua-objects, this line seems 
implausible. The simplicity and determinacy of the existence and identity 
conditions for qua-objects suggests that everything required for their rec-
ognition as entities is present, and the demand for some more absolute 
verification of their existence seems senseless.12
Armed with this provisional justification of (NC), let us return to the ar-
gument that the authorship property is actualizing. The argument is very 
simple. Suppose that g falls under the authorship property at a possible 
world w. By (NC), there is a nondivine object o such that o contingently ex-
ists at w. Thus, since (a) entails (c) and (a) holds at w, (c) holds at w, whence 
F*(g, a) holds at w. Since F* is a real relation, it is actualizing, so that g exists 
at w. This is what was to be shown.
Let’s connect this observation to the Realization Lemma. We have just 
seen that authorship, the property of being the creator of every nondivine 
contingent, is an actualizing property. Moreover it is a property that is an 
integral part of the conception of the nature of God associated with many 
forms of theism. As such, it is a property that would be held within those 
conceptions to be necessarily exemplified by God. Suppose that X0 is the 
collection of properties explicitly ascribed to the divine nature by such a 
conception. We can then consider, in the role of the class X in the Realiza-
tion Lemma, the smallest collection of properties including X0 and closed 
under property entailment and necessitation. Closure under property en-
tailment is the condition (ii) in the lemma, and closure under necessitation 
is the condition (i). Our assumption is that the initial set X0 contains the 
authorship property which, as just shown, is actualizing. Thus the condi-
tion (iv) is met as well. The Realization Lemma then ensures that if the set 
X is structurally consistent, then each property of X is satisfied by some actually 
existing object. Such a being would be an item existing in the actual world 
that falls under each of the initial properties in X0. It would therefore ex-
emplify authorship: it would enjoy the property of being creator of each 
nondivine contingent, and thus of having actually created each nondivine 
contingently existing thing.
VIII
What has happened here? We began by imagining a theist who has un-
dertaken to compile a partial characterization of the divine nature. He 
begins his list with authorship, the property of being creator of each non-
divine contingent. Let us call such a position authorship theism. Author ship 
theism, then, is a limited thesis about the divine nature that is not, on 
12For a contrasting view, with an excellent summary of alleged mereological difficulties 
surrounding facts and fact-like objects, see Ariana Betti, Against Facts. 
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its face, committed to the actual existence of a being exemplifying that 
nature. Now the collection of properties constituting the nature of any 
object is closed under entailment between properties and under the neces-
sitation rule. Accordingly, the structural consistency of the closure of the 
authorship-theist’s description of the divine nature under necessitation 
and entailment may be regarded as a necessary condition of the meta-
physical consistency of that description; and in that case the conclusion, 
via the Realization Lemma, that there necessarily exists a being exem-
plifying the authorship property, may be regarded as a byproduct of the 
metaphysical consistency of authorship-theism.
The same template may be used for various other versions of the ontolog-
ical argument, involving actualizing properties that the separate versions 
will argue, in each case on rather different grounds, to be properties essen-
tial to God. In these arguments, the initial properties are not at all suspect 
prima facie: they are theologically salient, indeed familiar, candidates for 
membership in the divine nature. Here are a few additional examples, with 
brief commentaries on their status as actualizing properties:
1. Sovereignty: Every nondivine contingent is dependent upon God. 
Such a property has the form
 (N1) λx (∀y)C D(y, x),
 where D represents a dependence relation.
There are in turn at least two natural candidates for an analysis of depen-
dence:
Strict dependence: y depends on x iff y could not exist without x; equiva-
lently, necessarily y exists only if x does, or again equivalently, the 
existence of y entails the existence of x.
Counterfactual dependence: y depends on x iff y would not exist if x did 
not exist.
Both of these relations entail a weaker relation Dϯ of material dependence, 
such that Dϯ(y, x) holds iff either x exists or y does not. This relation is 
clearly right-actualizing, and thus the stronger dependence relations are 
right-actualizing as well. Under either interpretation, then, it follows via 
(NC) that the property characterized by (N1) is an actualizing property.13
2. Omniscience. God is directly cognizant of every matter of fact.
Let us cast this epistemic attribute simply and directly into the form
(N2) λx(∀α)K(α, x)
13It is worth observing that the strict sovereignty property is entailed by the authorship 
property; but there may be forms of dependence of the created realm on God other than that 
arising from authorship as, for example, when we speak of God’s sustaining, rather than 
simply creating, contingent things. 
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where the variable “α” ranges over facts and K is an epistemic relation be-
tween God and states of affairs in the world whose behavior is analogous 
that of the relations expressed by perceptual verbs.14 The relation involves 
a real relation, we might call it direct cognitive contact, between the cognizer 
that the fact cognized that can obtain in any possible situation only if both 
relata exist therein. Since K is a real relation, it is actualizing, and so the 
property characterized by (N2) is an actualizing property, assuming that 
each possible world contains at least one fact.
3. Omnipresence. This is the property of being literally present at every 
spatial location at every time (or at every spatiotemporal location).
This property is a somewhat more controversial candidate for member-
ship in the divine nature than the properties mentioned previously; it is 
sometimes mistakenly thought to be entailed by the omniscience property. 
In any case, if we take literally the idea that God is present in each part of 
space, we are ascribing to God the property
(N3) λx ∀p Loc(x, p)
where p ranges over locations and Loc is the relation holding between an 
object and a place when the object is located at that place. That relation is 
actualizing, since for any object a and particular location p, Loc(a, p) holds 
at a world w only if a exists and occupies p at w. The property expressed 
by (N3) is thus also actualizing.
IX
Authorship, sovereignty, omniscience and omnipresence are all prop-
erties that have been central to discussions of the nature of God in 
philosophical theology. I have argued that each of these properties is 
actualizing, which, in an equivalent formulation, says that each of these 
properties stands in the property-entailment relation to the existence 
property λxε(x). I have already commented on the propensity of some 
philosophers to place the existence property itself into the divine nature. 
Echoing a common sentiment, I suggested above that placing existence 
into the nature of God at the outset of an ontological argument is ontically 
tendentious, and tends to rob the argument of probative force. However, 
this difficulty does not directly affect a form of the ontological argument 
derived from the Realization Lemma that places any or all of the above 
properties into the basis set X0. These properties represent fundamental 
conceptual commitments of forms of theism which are not, at least at face 
value, ontically tendentious.
Here, then, is a normal form for ontological arguments. Let us say that 
a set A of properties is essentially admissible if the closure of A under the 
14I do not take this analogy to imply a perceptual model of divine knowledge; it suffices 
to assume that whatever the mechanism of divine cognition, God has unmediated epistemic 
access to existing states of affairs. 
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entailment and necessitation rules is structurally consistent. We think of 
the set A as a partial specification of the nature of some possible object; 
the essential admissibility condition says roughly that one does not arrive 
at formally contradictory properties when one considers the properties 
which are necessarily exemplified by such an object relative to its neces-
sary exemplification of the properties in A. On the schema I am suggesting, 
an ontological argument will
1. Identify a set X0 = { ϕ1, ϕ2, … , ϕn } of properties that constitute a par-
tial specification of the divine nature.
2. Show that at least one of the ϕs is an actualizing property.
3. Conclude, by the Realization Lemma, that if X0 is essentially admis-
sible, then the properties in X0 are jointly exemplified by some actu-
ally existing object.
To obtain the conclusion that the properties in X0 are in fact instantiated, 
we need to add the premise
4. X0 is essentially admissible,
which is equivalent to the assertion that if a property is entailed by the 
properties ϕ such that ϕ ∈ X0, then the negation of that property is not. 
The justification of this assumption is to be given in other terms.
Arguments of the present sort, then, explicate ontological commitments 
of the metaphysical consistency of certain representations of the divine 
nature that may have seemed, at least prior to the arguments, existentially 
innocuous.
X
The present framework for ontological arguments is likely to prompt a fa-
miliar challenge, albeit in a somewhat unfamiliar form. Gaunilo famously 
responded to St. Anselm’s perfectionist version of the ontological argu-
ment by arguing that if it works at all, then one could show, in the same 
way and with equal plausibility, that there must exist a perfect island.15 
Echoes and analogues of Gaunilo’s objection have affected subsequent 
ontological arguments, and it is appropriate to ask if a version of the ob-
jection arises here as well.
A natural form of it is not far to seek. The mechanism that generates the 
conclusion of the ontological argument via the Realization Lemma allows 
any properties at all to figure in the initial set X0, as long as this set is es-
sentially admissible and contains some actualizing property. Thus consider 
an arbitrary property that is essential to any object that exemplifies it; for 
example the property H of being a horse. I shall take it that H is essential 
to any object that possesses it at all. Suppose now that we simply graft H 
15Gaunilo, “In Behalf of the Fool.”
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onto one of the partial characterizations of the divine nature above. Thus, 
for example, consider the set
X0 = {H, sovereignty, omniscience}.
We have seen that both sovereignty and omniscience are actualizing 
properties. Can one then argue via the Realization Lemma, with whatever 
plausibility as may accrue to the argument that arises by omitting H from 
X0, that there necessarily exists a sovereign and omniscient horse?
No. The difficulty concerns the essential admissibility condition for X0, 
which must be met if we are to move from Step 3 in an argument of the 
form described above to the conclusion that X0 is actually instantiated. 
We have prior modal opinions, grounded independently of our present 
context, which imply that sovereign horses are not possible. Consider, for 
example, the interpretation of sovereignty in terms of rigid dependence, 
according to which an item g is sovereign at a world w if it is true of any 
object that contingently exists at w that it could not have existed unless g 
had existed. This interpretation of the sovereignty condition is entailed by 
the authorship condition.16 But we have a firm modal opinion that the par-
ents of any horse could have existed without engendering that particular 
horse. If so, in any possible world the parent horses of any horse consti-
tute counterexamples to the thesis that every contingent particular in that 
world is strictly dependent on the given horse. I leave it to the reader to 
work out a similar modal justification of the impossibility of necessarily 
omniscient horses.
Can essentially the same response be made when the initial set consists 
of the canonical attributes of sovereignty and omniscience by themselves, 
or considered together? The answer is again “No.” Theists characteristi-
cally hold that everything (of a suitable sort) is dependent on God, and 
that this is a property that is implicated in the very identity of God. It 
is thus, for these theisms, an essential property of God, and so constitu-
tive of his nature. Someone who wishes to oppose this position cannot, 
without begging the question at issue, simply state a modal opinion to the 
effect that nothing could be essentially sovereign (in the relevant sense); a 
similar caution should hold good for the varieties of theism based on any 
combination of the canonical attributes. The claim that nothing could be es-
sentially both omniscient and sovereign, for example, requires argument 
in a way, or of a sort, that the claim that nothing could be essentially both 
equine and sovereign does not.
XI
The engine that drives an ontological argument of the sort I have been 
attempting to describe is quite clearly the assumption that an actualizing 
property can be essential or necessary to a particular item that exempli-
fies it. In the cases I have highlighted, the assumption takes the form of 
16See n13.
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the claim that God stands in some real relation or other to the created 
realm, not simply as a matter of fact but in virtue of his identity. And so 
the obvious way to forestall the conclusion of such an argument would be 
to withdraw this assumption. There are two ways of doing that. We can 
reject the assumption that God exemplifies the relevant property at all; or 
we may retain the assumption that he exemplifies the property but give 
up the idea that he does so essentially.
In the instances that we have considered, neither of these options seems 
compatible with conceptual commitments of normal forms of theism. The 
actualizing properties we have considered are basic theistic attributes such 
as authorship (God as universally creating/sustaining, the role of pantokrator 
described by the Greek fathers); sovereignty (the universal dependence of 
the contingent realm on God); omniscience; and omnipresence. These are 
hardly peripheral themes for the forms of theism that embrace them. To 
deny that God exemplifies any combination of at least the first three seems 
tantamount to changing the subject. And so to retain a theistic conception 
of God while avoiding the conclusion of the argument, one would have to 
hold that God falls under these attributes but to deny that they are part of 
his nature. But that is not much better. If they are extrinsic to his nature, 
they are not implicated in the very identity of God as an individual. A 
form of theism that held this would be in the very peculiar position of 
asserting that these very basic properties are in the most metaphysically 
fundamental sense accidental accretions to the divine nature.17
In any case it seems to me that within the Western theistic tradition 
the tendency has been to combine the view that God exemplifies these 
properties with an essentialist explanation of why he does. The doctrine 
is that he exemplifies them in virtue of his nature or identity. For such 
a theistic orientation, then, the thesis that God falls under these funda-
mental properties is not really detachable from the thesis that he does so 
essentially or in virtue of his nature. Thus, if the properties in question 
make up the set X0 in the schema described above, for these orientations, 
the thesis that X0 is essentially admissible is clearly pertinent. Essential 
admissibility seems a necessary condition of the metaphysical consistency 
of a specification of the nature of any object: what the schema of section IX 
shows, then, is roughly that the metaphysical consistency of a description 
of the divine nature ensures its actual realization if that description incor-
porates at least one actualizing property. And we have seen that some of 
the most theologically salient descriptions of the divine nature impute to 
it properties of just this sort.
17To put the point in somewhat different terms, the properties considered above are plau-
sibly also basic perfections. I observed above that not all perfections of God are constituent 
properties of the divine nature, since some are contingent. But the most basic ones do have 
this status within the most familiar forms of theism. The contingent perfections are derived 
from conjunctions of basic perfections and contingent facts. For example, having created the 
actual world is a product of authorship (a basic perfection) and the fact that the particular 
world we inhabit is the actual one (a contingent fact); or knowing that Alexander was a pupil 
of Aristotle is a product of omniscience and the fact that Alexander was a pupil of Aristotle. 
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We normally distinguish the conceptual commitments of a theistic posi-
tion from its ontological commitments.18 The conceptual commitments of a 
form of theism tell us about the nature of God as a person. It tells us a story 
about what God would be essentially like if there were such a person. One 
would have naively thought that such a story could be consistently told 
without generating an ontological commitment to the person character-
ized in it. Familiar forms of the ontological argument blur this distinction 
in a radical way by placing something like the existence property into the 
divine nature at the outset. But the general form for the argument explored 
here shows that any actualizing property will initiate a more subtle but 
analogous construction, and any essential description of God in terms of 
his real connections to the world will assign such properties to his nature. 
If any of these are regarded as theologically basic, then, we shall have to 
give up the attempt to provide a metaphysically consistent fundamental 
characterization of the divine nature that does not commit us to the actual 
existence of an item falling under the characterizing properties.
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